In Free Speech Coalition Inc. v. Paxton, the Supreme Court ruled that a Texas law requiring age verification to access pornography is constitutional (Jouvenal & Oremus, 2025).  In this research paper we provide legal and philosophical analysis of the case of Free Speech Coalition Inc. v Paxton. We detail the ruling, the majority, and the dissenting opinion, focusing on the legal reasoning exercised by Supreme Court judges. We also explain the legal reasoning behind the original decision of the district court. Furthermore, we describe the legal arguments put forth by the plaintiffs and defendants. We explain the three different types of legal scrutiny, as well as why Supreme Court and District Court judges chose differing levels of scrutiny. We also detail the situations in which judges typically choose to exercise certain levels of scrutiny. Furthermore, we provide an account of Ronald Dworkin's rights-based theory of law, his law-as-integrity theory, and Judith Jarvis Thomson's non-absolutist theory of rights. Finally, we analyze the majority and dissenting opinions thrice each, through the lens of these three legal philosophies. Judith Thompson would likely have stood on the side of the majority, as she believed that infringing on individual rights was justifiable due to extenuating circumstances (Thompson, 1977). Dworkin would argue that the majority weakened the First Amendment by prioritizing a collective goal over individual rights. He would also have contended that the majority and dissenting opinions ruled differently based on the different ways they balanced aesthetic judgments, principles, prior decisions, and community moral standards.