Elite actors play a central role in shaping political and regulatory outcomes in the United States. Prior research demonstrates that financial institutions maintain close ties to government agencies, particularly through career movement between regulatory bodies and private firms. Former regulators are often recruited into finance, creating durable institutional linkages between the financial sector and the state. While this literature documents the existence of these ties, it does not systematically compare levels of state connectedness across different elite sectors.

This study examines whether financial elites are more institutionally connected to the state than non-financial elites in the United States. To address this question, a dataset of elite individuals is constructed using publicly available rankings and leadership listings. Individuals are classified into three groups: financial elites, hybrid elites with cross-sector careers, and non-financial elites. For each individual, a state connection score is developed based solely on documented institutional ties to government bodies, including direct public sector employment and formal advisory appointments. These roles are weighted and adjusted for duration to generate a standardized measure of institutional connectedness.

I hypothesize that financial elites will exhibit higher average state connection scores than non-financial elites. By identifying systematic differences across sectors, this study offers clearer empirical insight into how elite influence is structured within the public sector.  It contributes to broader debates about elite power and the relationship between economic influence and the state in contemporary American politics.