This research examines why crisis leads to further political integration and a weakening of institutions in different cases. In existing political science literature, crisis is often viewed as a driver of integration. However, the scholarly literature has mainly studied this phenomenon within the European Union (EU). This study takes a comparative approach, examining both the EU and the United States under the Articles of Confederation, two systems with a supranational governing body. A supranational governing body transcends national boundaries and is composed of individual sovereign states that join the system as member states. These member states give up some of their sovereignty in exchange for membership and the ability to pool resources to address issues. While crises in the EU have often prompted further integration, crises under the Articles of Confederation ultimately led to the system’s dissolution and replacement with the U.S. Constitution. The research uses comparative case studies and archival analysis to examine how crises were socially constructed, interpreted, and politicized in each case. Preliminary findings demonstrate that identities, norms, and political taboos drive how crises are socially constructed. These socially constructed crises then influence whether political actors pursue further integration or halt existing institutions.