Central banks in independent nations drive monetary policy, thereby shaping the economic landscape. Their impact is steadfast, but the way in which they are utilized varies greatly. It’s been debated whether or not operational independence for a central bank leads to greater economic prosperity for the host nation. Existing literature surrounding the topic suggests greater CBI (Central Bank Independence) may not create growth itself, but rather lay the foundation by implementing a stable monetary environment for prosperity. Additionally, the “Time Inconsistency Problem” presents the crucial argument that true CBI eliminates the political temptations (election success) of short term shocks which are ultimately harmful for economies in the long run. To evaluate this complicated relationship between CBI and growth, the Romelli CBIE Index will be used. The index annually scores the countries and their central bank independence from 0-1, using a combination of over 40 different criteria regarding institutional design across 6 dimensions: Governor and central bank board, monetary policy and conflict resolution, objectives, lending limitations to government, financial independence, and reporting/disclosure. Using a difference in difference analysis, points of treatment (when a country’s CBI increases or decreases) will be identified and cross analyzed with indicators of economic health and well being. From there, a hypothesized and comprehensive link between the increasing of CBI and economic growth will be laid out for final evaluation. If there is a proven relationship between the two, it could have larger implications in how countries choose to operate their central banks in the future.