Abortion Rights: A Case for the Equal Protection Clause

Presenter: Mila Yana Splawska

Faculty Sponsor: Martha Yoder

School: UMass Amherst

Research Area: Law and Legal Studies

Session: Poster Session 1, 10:30 AM - 11:15 AM, Concourse, B4

ABSTRACT

The constitutional status of abortion rights in the United States has shifted dramatically over the past half-century. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized abortion as a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and grounded the right to abortion in a broader right to privacy. The Court created the trimester framework to balance the interests of pregnant individuals and state interests in the fetus, which were found to be compelling in the third trimester. Although Planned Parenthood v. Casey reaffirmed Roe’s central holding, it abandoned the trimester framework, replacing it with the undue burden standard and relocated constitutional protection to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, however, the Court rejected the due process foundation altogether, holding that the Constitution does not protect any right to abortion and returning regulatory authority to the states.

This project proposes that the instability of abortion rights stems from the Court’s reliance on substantive due process arguments to protect abortion rather than the Equal Protection Clause. Drawing on feminist and intersectional legal theory, I argue that abortion restrictions constitute a form of discrimination that both mirrors and entrenches structural inequality. Such laws not only reflect a historical pattern of subordinating women, but also disproportionately burden low-income individuals and people of color, deepening racial and economic disparities. This research synthesizes feminist legal literature to advance an intersectional framework that highlights the discriminatory design and unequal effects of abortion restrictions and makes the case for renewed protection under the Equal Protection Clause.

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