Virtue Ethics and Parts of the Mind

Presenter: Cadyn E. Glynn

Faculty Sponsor: Daniel Soucy

School: Mount Wachusett Community College

Research Area: Psychology and Behavioral Sciences

Session: Poster Session 3, 1:15 PM - 2:00 PM, Auditorium, A71

ABSTRACT

In the practice of virtue ethics, the inside of the mind is relevant as its own place where virtue should be pursued, not only so that we may act ethically toward others, but also so that the parts of our mind may act virtuously toward one another. Contemporary psychology has established a framework for cultivating healthy intrapersonal relationships through Internal Family Systems, a therapy modality that can also be used to model the mind in general; meanwhile, virtue ethics was established by Aristotle and has subsequently been elaborated on by many further philosophers, although for the sake of time only Aristotle will be addressed here. More generally, it does not seem that the implications of virtue ethics on intrapersonal behavior have been investigated. To remediate this, I look at Aristotle’s moral virtues and discuss how and why parts of the mind may encourage or discourage the whole from practicing any given virtue. I argue that, in order to more effectively practice virtue, we should cultivate healthy relationships among our parts so that they may act more virtuously toward each other and the whole. While the idea that acting kindly toward oneself is good is not novel, I hope that explicitly addressing the difficulty in practicing interpersonal virtue as the result of a lack of intrapersonal virtuous behavior demonstrates the importance of the inside of the mind when trying to behave ethically in everyday life.



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